Lessons from an angry volcano

In eight years, the Philippines has had

two volcanic eruptions and is

anticipating another one.

Mt. Pinatubo in Central Luzon erupted on June 15, 1991, and Mt.

Mayon in Albay, in February 1993. Both claimed lives and

property, but Pinatubo's eruption, considered as the most

destructive, left a continuing disaster in its aftermath. Mayon is

showing signs of restiveness again.

Have disaster response agencies learned to deal better with

restive volcanoes?

''SURELY, Filipinos have lessons from which we can improve

our responses to coming volcanic eruptions,'' says Aida

Ishikawa, executive director of the Central Luzon Center for

Emergency Aid and Rehabilitation.

Concern tackled its disaster response management to Mt.

Pinatubo's eruption through a network of service institutions

and sectoral organizations in Pampanga, Tarlac and Zambales.

The magnitude of the eruption--characterized by voluminous

pyroclastic materials that rains wash down yearly as lahar, thick

layers of ash blown by a tropical storm's wind, and lahar

gushing in eight major river channels and spilling into

tributaries in Pampanga, Tarlac and Zambales--needed a

network-type of response.

The huge number of population at risk, at more than one million,

including 50,000 Aetas living on the slopes of the volcano,

makes such response necessary.

Network response

A number of groups used this strategy when they assisted

Pinatubo victims before, during and after the eruption.

Each member of the network has put in its own specialization in

education and training, organizing, advocacy, relief operations

and rehabilitation programs.

It helped that before the eruption, the Philippines had an

extensive community of non-government organizations that

since the 1960s have been engaged in empowerment work

through health, literacy, livelihood and organizing programs in

poor communities.

''We complement each other, not compete. That was how we did

it and are still doing it,'' Ishikawa recalls.

Like other NGOs, Concern found it correct to serve the people

most vulnerable to disasters, meaning those who have less

capability to deal with disasters.

The group asked the government to give priority in its

disaster-response activities to the farmers, workers and Aetas,

citing its responsibility.

In a situation where fear had created a sense of hopelessness

and inaction, Ishikawa says Concern also learned the

importance of nurturing people's trust in their own actions.

''The people's initiatives and their organized response were very

crucial because by taking the lead to save their lives and

property, they have immediately reduced the risks even before

help could come their way. We came in to support,'' Ishikawa

says.

Pinatubo blast

''The Mt. Pinatubo eruption (in 1991) provides an excellent

example of how accurate forecasting and timely warning saved

lives,'' Tayag and her co-writers say. They based their findings

on the results of two surveys done in 1991 and 1992.

They have listed several lessons from 1991.

''The failure in 1991 of 18 percent of those who were forewarned

to take any defensive action and the delayed or selective

evacuation of 34 percent of those who received evacuation

orders indicate some failure to stimulate protective action,'' the

writers said.

Phivolcs traced this weakness either to the ''failure of the

institute and disaster response organizations to reach the

respondents'' or that the information campaign ''failed to drive

home to them the magnitude of the threat and the urgency, as

well as the possibility of avoiding the volcano's fury.''

There were also deficiencies in the system of transmitting the

warnings to the most remote areas. Thus, Phivolcs stressed the

importance of organized actions.

The Negrito Alliance of Zambales managed to overcome the

problems of transportation and terrain. They brought the

warning and evacuation orders to Aetas scattered in small

settlements on the slopes of the volcano.

Alert levels

Because the alert levels used during the Pinatubo eruption in

June 1991 and July 1992 were the same despite the difference in

the scale of volcanic activities, Phivolcs said these ''may have

given rise to undue concern and inspired exaggerated media

reporting.''

Still using the 1991 alert levels, a radio announcer in 1992 took

Phivolcs' alert levels 4 and 5 as warnings of imminent eruption

within 72 hours.

Residents overreacted by evacuating. Officials sent vehicles for

evacuation.

The problem was also the result of ''inconsistency in the danger

zone associated with the various alert levels.''

The 1991 alert level 4 covered the 20-km danger zone. Alert level

5 covered both the 20-km and 40-km danger zones.

A 40-km danger zone was declared because there was concern

about pyroclastic flows from a big eruption and the possibility

that a caldera might form, Phivolcs explained.

''After the 1992 experience, revision of the alert levels was in

order. The revised alert levels allow for differentiation of large

and small eruptions,'' Tayag's team advised.

''A Pilipino version of the alert level scheme could be

pilot-tested the next time one of our volcanoes becomes

restive,'' Phivolcs advised.

Because of the 1992 false evacuation order from the radio

announcer, critics said it would be wiser for Phivolcs to transmit

information through disaster response coordinating councils

than with the media.

That way, the source of erroneous reporting could be detected

at once.

''The institution of an emergency broadcast system might

provide a mechanism for effectively involving media in warning

transmission,'' Phivolcs recommended.