100 years of Mindanao struggles -2

Marcos and Mindanao

Marcos' plan for Mindanao further complicated matters. A

massive infrastructure development program was matched by a

methodical attack on his local opponents and the gradual increase

of military presence.

In Cotabato, the government supported migrant vigilantism like

Feliciano Luces' (Commander Toothpick) Ilagas, reinforcing

Maguindanaoan fears that Manila and the Christians were out to

eliminate them.

Anti-Marcos politicians fought back, but to no avail. Marcos

used patronage and coercion to break them down and where

additional muscle was necessary, he relied on syndicates like the

Octopus Gang (politics, however, did not anticipate the coming to

the scene of a new force).

Students, inspired by the Vietnam War, Mao's Great Cultural

Revolution, and Vatican II, began to make their presence felt in

Mindanao politics. In the Christian provinces, the Kabataang

Makabayan and the Khi Rho attracted adherents who became

vocal critics of the state and local power and demanded

revolutionary change.

Soon after, the first cells of the Communist Party of the

Philippines were established.

Muslim students also demanded an end to ''Filipino'' imperialism

and they were joined by compatriots inspired by Nasserite

nationalism and Islam fundamentalism. Together they

re-galvanized separatism made dormant by their fathers'

accommodation by Manila.

With martial law, the state imposed a strong presence in

Mindanao. Muslim communities responded by uniting behind the

Moro National Liberation Front of Nur Misuari, Salamat Hashim

and AbulKhayr Alonto. The MNLF engaged the military in a

conventional war that cost more than half a million lives, a million

refugees and about $1 million a day from the dictator's coffers.

Battlefield losses forced the MNLF to the bargaining table. While

it continued to receive support from Libya, it splintered into

factions. Hashim broke away from Misuari and formed the

then-moderate Maguindanao-dominated Moro Islamic Liberation

Front, while Alonto made peace with Marcos. By 1979, the

rebellion was practically over.

Unintended beneficiary

The war was no boon to the dictatorship. The CPP was an

unintended beneficiary as the war on Muslim separatism allowed

the communists to make adjustments to their ''people's war.''

Likewise, the prospect of an unsuccessful warfare--a Vietnam

War-like syndrome--bred mistrust inside the Army on the dictator.

The seeds of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement

(RAM--later renamed Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabayan)

and its aborted coup against Marcos were sown.

Martial law, however, expanded Marcos' patronage network.

Alongside old allies like Dimaporo and Almendras rose new

cronies like Antonio Floirendo, who dominated the banana

industry.

Patrimonial at its core, the banana industry nevertheless led the

way in the spread of capitalist agriculture. Rice farms in Cotabato

turned corporate, albeit small and capital-deficient. Eduardo

Cojuangco's takeover of the coconut industry likewise showed

signs that this traditional export would undergo some

modernization.

Patrimonial plunder, however, got the better of capitalist

development. Militarization and cronyism further spurred the CPP

and pushed the MILF toward radical Islamic fundamentalism.

By the 1980s, the MILF had a viable base in Maguindanao and

the CPP was in all the Christian provinces. The communists'

Mindanao Commission then launched the second Mindanao war,

employing a strategy that tied down the Armed Forces of the

Philippines militarily, undermined local power, and mobilized

thousands.

Mindanao communists were confident that the final confrontation

between the state and revolutionaries would happen.

Mindanao after Marcos

Cory and the 1986 revolt on Edsa altered all these. Marcos fell but

Mindanao communism also declined.

The uncontrolled execution of suspected spies decimated the CPP

so badly that in a year, it lost its strongest regional body and

ended communist dreams of seizing power by the 1990s.

However, this fragmentation had some unintended

consequences. Popular democracy, sometimes bordering on

anarchism or single-issue politics, thrived through the NGO

movement to partially offset the vacuum left by the splintered

CPP. A leftist political presence, albeit disjointed, persisted.

Popular right wing forces also emerged. With military support,

groups like the Alsa Masa and the Kuratong Baleleng became

buzzwords. The first did not last long, disappearing once military

patronage was withdrawn. The other outlived its counterparts by

becoming involved in the informal economy.

Edsa also forced the RAM to abandon its plan to dominate

post-Marcos politics, although this did not deter Gringo

Honasan's cabal from trying to overthrow President Corazon

Aquino. Their coups failed, the separatist attempt by Alexander

Noble turning into a comedy of errors.

Eventually the RAM and its progeny, the Young Officers Union,

made peace with the government, allowing the military to devote

its full attention to destroying the CPP and containing the MILF.

Surrender

The MNLF also surrendered to then President Fidel Ramos and

Misuari became the third head of the Autonomous Region in

Muslim Mindanao. As administrator, Misuari proved to be no

different from his predecessors, packing the ARMM with cronies,

showing no ability to implement a comprehensive economic

recovery program for Muslim areas and preferring travelling to

governing.

Edsa also rejuvenated cacique democracy, albeit with slight

variations. Old politicos returned via the art of turncoatism,

although some--as the bribery case of Hilarion Ramiro (Misamis

Occidental) and the rape case of Romeo Jalosjos (Zamboanga del

Norte) suggest--had turned from bad to worse.

Yet so profound was Edsa's impact that the system allowed a new

generation of leaders with more vision to come to power. Vicente

Emano (Misamis Oriental), Roan Libarios (Agusan del Norte) and

Daisy Fuentes (Southern Cotabato) represent this new breed.

Offsprings of old politicos also seem different from their fathers.

Miguel Zubiri (Bukidnon) is a nationalist and opposition figure,

while Philip Tan has successfully turned his father's fiefdom,

Tangub City, into a thriving town, displacing Ozamiz as the center

of Misamis Occidental.

Into the Next Century

All these indicate that the rebellious current has diminished and

integrationist politics is once more ascendant.

Mindanao's political elites, including the NGOs, have come to

accept the reality that Manila is a major player in the island's life.

For them to be effective, they will have to play the game while

finding ways to exploit the system's weaknesses.

That more Mindanaoans can now speak Pilipino, albeit in crude

ABS-CBN Tagalog, only serves to underscore the renewed power

of integrative politics.

Yet, centrifugal tendencies, represented by the MILF and

reflected in the ''Mindanaoan'' consciousness of the migrants'

grandchildren, endure.

Thus, it would not be safe to rule out rebellion in Mindanao's

future.